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One of the great objects of government is to protect the life,
liberty and property of individual citizens, and to accomplish this
purpose, it is customary for constitutions to limit the powers of
the government and thereby operate as bulwarks of liberty for
the protection of private rights. In considering the question as
to whether a citizen has a right to a trial by jury in a prosecu-
tion for a petty federal offense, we must first determine whether
or not the Constitution of the United States guarantees a trial
by jury in these cases.
In Article 3, Section 2, of the Constitution, we find that the
"trial of all crimes, except in cases of impeachment, shall be by
jury." The Sixth Amendment to the Constitution provides that
"in all criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right
to a speedy and public trial by an impartial jury of the state and
district wherein the crime shall have been committed."
At first glance, it would seem that the question propounded
could be easily and quickly answered, and a literal construction
of the words used would certainly require a jury in such prose-
cutions, but the Constitution must be interpreted by reference to
the common law and British institutions as they existed when
the instrument was framed and adopted,1 and in this instance,
a study of colonial institutions and customs at the time of the
adoption of the Constitution is also essential. History plays a
most important part in determining what meaning the authors
of these provisions designed that they should convey to others.!
* The James F. Brown Prize Essay, 1931-32. In 1919 the late James F.
Brown of the Class of 1873 gave $5,000 to the University to be invested and
the annual income used as a prize for the best essay on a subject relating
to the individual liberties of the citizen guaranteed by the Federal or State
Constitution. Any senior or graduate of any college of the University,
within one year after receiving his bachelor's degree, may compete for the
prize.
* Member of the Bar, Charleston, West Virginia.
Rzx parte Grossman, 267 U. S. 87, 45 S. Ct. 332 (1925).
The interpretation of the Constitution of the United States is necessarily
influenced by the fact that its provisions are framed in the language of the
English common law and are to be read in the light of its history. Smith
v. Alabama, 124 U. S. 465, 478, 8 S. Ct. 564, 569 (1888).
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Interpretation of Constitutional Provisions
Did the framers of the Constitution intend that the word
"crimes" as used in the third article should include petty of-
fenses ? Blackstone, writing about twenty years before the adop-
tion of the Constitution, said:
"A crime or misdemeanor is an act committed or omitted
in violation of a public law either forbidding or command-
ing it. This general definition comprehends both crimes and
misdemeanors, which properly speaking, are mere synony-
mous terms, though in common usage the word 'crimes' is
made to denote such offenses as are of a deeper and more
atrocious dye, while smaller faults and omissions of less con-
sequence are comprised under the gentler term of mis-
demeanors only. "'
With this idea in mind, one can appreciate the action of the
Constitutional Convention in drafting the Constitution. The
first draft provided that "trial of all criminal offenses shall be by
juiy," but by unanimous vote, it was amended to read, "the trial
of all crimes". If the language had remained as first used, it
might be contended that it meant all offenses of a criminal nature,
petty as well as serious, but when changed from "criminal of-
fenses" to "crimes" and made in the light of the popular under-
standing of the word "crimes," as stated by Blackstone, it is ob-
vious that the intent was to exclude from the constitutional re-
quirement of a jury, the trial of criminal petty offenses.'
The language of the Sixth Amendment is different from that
of Article 3, and shifts from "trial of all crimes" to "in all
criminal prosecutions". There is no indication that the framers
of the Amendment meant to change the meaning which they ex-
pected to be applied to the Third Article. The fears of the people
that their rights were not fully secured by the Constitution were
to be allayed by the Amendments and the purpose of this Amend-
ment seems to have been to enumerate the rights of the accused in
criminal prosecutions. No desire for a change was evident and
' COmMExTAmIES 5 (1768).
' Schick v. United States, 195 U. S. 65, 70, 24 S. Ct. 826, 827, I Ann. Cas.
585 (1904).
"The word 'crime' in its more extended sense, comprehends every viola-
tion of public law; in a limited sense, it embraces offenses of a serious or
atrocious character. In our opinion, the provision is to be interpreted in
the light of the principles which, at common law, determined whether the
accused, in a given class (f cases, was entitled to be tried by a jury."
Callan v. Wilson, 127 U. S. 540, 549, 8 S. Ct. 1301, 1303 (1888).
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only a rearrangement of the language was made." Madison, who
framed the Amendment, was a resident of Virginia, where before
and after this time, the right of trial by jury was not extended
to the accused in prosecutions for petty offenses.
In Patton v. United States," the Supreme Court declared that
the first ten Amendments and the Constitution were substantially
contemporaneous and should be construed in pari materia. So
construed, the latter may be regarded as reflecting the meaning
of the former. The Court specifically decided that the provisions
of the Sixth Amendment, although occurring later than that in
respect of jury trials in the Third Article of the Constitution,
are not to be regarded as modifying or altering the original pro-
visions. The same interpretation, therefore, is to be given to the
Third Article and the Sixth Amendment.
The men who framed the Constitution and the first ten
Amendments thereto were trained in British law and customs,
and brought into this country English laws and ideas. A study
of the history of trial by jury in England prior to the lime of the
adoption of the Constitution is necessary to determine the scope
which the framers of the Constitution and the Amendments
meant to give the provisions relating to jury trials.'
Most great commentators and writers on English law refer
to Magna Charta as security for the privilege of trial by jury.
Blackstone thought so. Others say that this important document
had no reference to jury trial as we understand it,8 but that
it was only intended to give the barons a trial by jury when
their lands were taken. While it cannot be said with certainty
that the clause had any distinct reference to a jury trial in the
true import of the term as we now understand it, it did embody
51 GALES & SEATON'S HISTORY OF DEBATES' IN CONGRESS, pp. 440-463, 690,
730, 796, 809. Madison in debate said: "This, (referring to amount neces-
sary for appeal to the Supreme Court) with the regulations respecting jury
trials in criminal cases and suits at common law, it is to be hoped will quiet
and reconcile the minds of the people to that part of the Constitution."
7bid. 458.
281 U. S. 276, 50 S. Ct. 253, 70 A. L. R. 263 (1930).
1 "The statesmen and lawyers of the Convention who submitted it (the Con-
stitution) to the ratification of the Conventions of the thirteen states, were
born and brought up in the atmosphere of the dommon law and thought and
spoke its vocabulary." Ex parte Grossman, supra n. 1, at 267 U. S. 109.8 Madison, in the debate on the constitutional amendments, in speaking of
trial by jury, freedom of the press, and liberty of conscience, said: "Yet
their Magna Charta does not contain any one provision for the security of
those rights, respecting which the people of the United States are most
alarmed." GALEs & SEATON's HISTORY, supra n. 5, at 453.
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a principle that underlies that trial and which became established
and recognized as a right guaranteed under a stipulation of a
royal compact.' During the reign of John, we find jury trials
in criminal cases, and by the 14th Century, Englishmen recog-
nized the right to have twelve men stand between them and the
vengeance of the king in criminal proceedings. The right of trial
by jury, however, was drastically limited for two centuries before
the separation of the colonies."0 Blackstone recognized this fact
and feared that the limitation of the right to trial by jury had
been extended too far.' The limited part played by juries in
criminal trials in England has continued to the present time and
there are now many offenses which are triable summarily by the
magistrates.
The practice of providing for the trial of petty offenses by
magistrates without the aid of juries was carried into this
country and was in general operation prior to the adoption of the
Constitution. Massachusetts had one hundred and seventy such
offenses; Connecticut had sixty; Pennsylvania, thirty; Maryland,
seVenty-five and Virginia, sixty-five. New York followed the
English practice, and New Jersey listed certain offenses as petty
where the penalty was a minor one.'
The fact that the practice of trying petty offenses without
juries continued after the adoption of the Constitution and the
Amendments indicates conclusively that the framers of these pro-
visions did not intend that the constitutional right of trial by
jury should be extended to prosecutions for petty offenses before
magistrates who had authority to try summarily persons accused
of such offenses. That the safeguard applied only in the case of
a trial of a person accused of committing a serious offense was
evidently the common understanding.
0 PROFFATT ON JuRY TRIALS (1876) par. 24, pp. 36, 37.1oFranlfurter and Corcoran, Petty Federal Offenses and the Constitutional
Guaranty of Trial by Jury (1926) 39 HALv. L. REv. 917.
u"By a summary proceeding, I mean principally such as is directed by
several acts of parliament (for the common law is a stranger to it, unless
in the case of contempts) for the conviction of offenders, and the inflicting
of certain penalties created by those acts of parliament. In these there is
no intervention of a jury, but the party accused is acquitted or condemned
by the suffrage of such person only, as the statute has appointed for hisjudge. An institution designed professedly for the greater ease of the sub-ject, by doing him speedy justice, and by not harassing the freeholders with
frequent and troublesome attendances to try every minute offense. But it
has of late been so far extended, as if a check be not timely given, to
threaten the disuse of our admirable and truly English trial by jury, unless
only in capital cases." 4 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTAIES (1768) 280,
"Frankfurter and Corcoran, op. cit. supra n. 10,
4
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The Supreme Court of the United States has passed upon the
question of the constitutional guaranty of a trial by jury in prose-
eutions for petty offenses in several cases, and it seems to be set-
tled that the constitutional guaranties of a jury in the trial of
all crimes, and of a right to a speedy and public trial by an im-
partial jury in all criminal prosecutions do not refer to trials
or prosecutions for minor or petty offenses, which according to
the common law may be proceeded against summarily." It has
been decided that the constitutional right to a trial by jury ap-
plies only to cases in which the guaranty existed at common law,
or was secured by statute at the time the Constitution was
adopted."
What Are Petty Offenses
That there may be offenses called "petty offenses" which do
not rise to the degree of crimes is settled,' yet it is impossible to'
define the term "petty offenses" or to list with any degree of
certainty those offenses which might be called "petty". In this
class of summary proceedings, Blackstone included: (1) Trials
of offenses and frauds contrary to the laws of the excise and other
branches of the revenue, (2) proceedings before justices of the
peace to inflict divers petty pecuniary mulcts and corporal penal-
ties denounced by act of Parliament for many disorderly offenses,
such as common swearing, drunkenness, vagrancy, idleness, and a
vast variety of others which were formerly tried by jury in the
court-leet, (3) methods immemorially used by superior courts of
justice of punishing contempts by attachment and subsequent pro-
ceedings thereon."
'5Callan v. Wilson, 127 U. S. 540, 8 S. C. 1301 (1888); Lawton v. Steele,
152 U. S. 133, 14 S. Ct. 499 (1894); Schick v. United States, 195 U. S. 65,
S. Ct. 826, 1 Ann. Cas. 585 (1904); District of Columbia v. Colts, 282 U. S.
63, 51 S. Ct. 52 (1930); Low v. United States, 94 C. C. A. 1, 169 Fed. 86
(C. C. A. 6th, 1909).
"'Thompson v. Utah, 170 U. S. 343, 18 S. Ct. 620 (1898); Capital Trac-
tion Company v. Hof, 174 U. S. 1, 19 S. Ct. 580 (1898); Patton v. United
States, supra n. 6; District of Columbia v. Colts, supra n. 13. See other
cases cited in 16 R. C. L. 194 and 6 R. C. L. Perm. Supp., 1932 Supp., p.
795.
'5"That there may be many offenses called "petty offenses" which do
not rise to the degree of crimes within the meaning of Article 3, and in
respect of which Congress may dispense with a jury trial, is settled." Dis-
trict of Columbia v. Colts, supra n. 13, citing Schick v. United States, supra
n. 13. See Natal v. Louisiana, 139 U. S. 621, 624, 11 S. Ct. 636 (1891);
Lawton v. Steele, supra n. 13; State v. Rodgers, 91 N. J. L. 212, 214, 102
Atl. 433 (1917).
"4 3LAOKTONE, COMXENTAXIES, c. 20, p. 281,
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Offenses triable summarily in the Colonies included; pro-
fanity, drunkenness, Sabbath statutes, immorality, vagrancy, dis-
orderly conduct, scolding, illicit sale of liquor, fraudulent weigh-
ing, failure to observe standards fixed for certain commodities,
swearing rashly and vainly, selling liquor to Indians, hunting and
fishing, fornication, concealed weapons, clamorous scolding, blas-
phemy, roguery, petty threatening of harm to persons and goods,
residing among Indians, adultery, improper care of servants,
profanation of holy days, eating flesh in Lent, and many others of
like nature.'
The right of trial by jury for contempt never existed at com-
mon law and it has always been held that courts have the right
to punish contempts summarily and without a jury except where
expressly provided for by statute.8
The rule seems to be settled that the constitutional right of
trial by jury does not apply to violations of municipal ordinances,
at least where the offensive act is not also a violation of the crim-
inal laws of the state, and so violators of municipal ordinances
generally are not held entitled to a jury."
It has been held that the sale of oleomargarine without a
stamp, where the penalty was fifty dollars fine, is a petty offense
and may be classed with such offenses as acting as an auctioneer
or peddler without a license, or making a deed without affixing
17 Frankfurter and Corcoran, op. cit. supra n. 10.
"Ex parte Robinson, 19 Wall. 505, 22 L. ed. 205 (1874). See numerous
cases' cited in Note (1931) 75 L. ed. (U. S.) 177, 185; 4 BLACKSTONE, 1O.
cit. supra n. 11. Under Article 3, Section 2, held that equity court cannot
adjudge defendant guilty of bootlegging as basis for granting an injunction
so as to punish for contempt for a subsequent violation under National Pro-
hibition Act. United States v. Cunningham, 21 Fed. (2d) 800 (D. Neb.
1927).
" See Natal v. Louisiana, supra n. 15 (keeping private market within six
squares of public market). See cases cited in Note (1931) 75 L. ed. (U.
S.) 177.
"Violations of municipal by-laws proper, such as fall within the descrip-
tion of municipal police regulations, as for example, those concerning mar-
kets, street*s, water works, city officers, etc., and which relate to acts and
omissions that are not embraced in the general criminal legislation of the
state, the legislature may authorize to be prosecuted in a summary man-
ner, by and in the name of the corporation, and need not provide for a trial
by jury. Such acts and omissions are not crimes or misdemeanors to which
the constitutional right of trial by jury extends." 1 DiLLoN ON MuNoiPAL
CoRpoaATIoNs (3d ed. 1881) § 433, quoted in Callan v. Wilson, supra n. 13.
There is not a state in the Union which has not a constitutional provision
entitling persons charged with crime to a trial by jury, and yet from time
immemorial the practice has been to try persons charged with petty offenses
before a police magistrate, who not only passes upon the question of guilt
but metes out the proper punishment, Lawton v, Steele, supra n, 13.
6
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 39, Iss. 1 [1932], Art. 5
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol39/iss1/5
PETTY FEDERAL OFFENSES
the proper stamp. ' The abatement of public nuisances by sum-
mary proceedings has been approved.'
Libel,2' reckless driving so as to endanger life and prop-
erty, ' and conspiracy' have been classed as serious offenses or
crimes within the meaning of the Constitution. An offense under
the National Prohibition Act which carried punishment to the
extent of $1000.00 fine and twelve months imprisonment, was held
not to be a petty crime, ' and it has been said that where the
term of imprisonment is one year, it is a crime. ' It was held in
another instance that for any criminal offense for which a person
is liable to infamous punishment, a trial by jury cannot be denied
the defendant. ' In Schick v. United States,' the court stated that
the nature of the offense and the amount of punishment prescrib-
ed rather than its place in the statutes determine whether it is
to be classed among serious or petty offenses, whether it is a crime
or misdemeanor. This does not mean that all misdemeanors are
petty offenses. '  In the Colts case, ' the court said that whether
an offense shall be classed as a crime so as to necessitate a jury
trial, or a petty offense triable summarily by a magistrate, is de-
pendent primarily upon the nature of the offense.
There is no yardstick or formula with which to determine
whether an offense is a petty or serious one; the decision to be
rendered in a particular case depending upon the judgment of
the court rather than upon the application of a mechanical test.
It cannot be said that all the offenses which were listed as petty
at the time of the adoption of the Constitution are petty offenses
today, for in some cases, what was a petty offense then has since
become a serious one. Nor would it be logical to conclude that
only those offenses which were petty then should be called petty
now, for offenses which have been created since that time may
2
0Schick v. United States, supra n. 13.
21Lawton v. Steele, supra n. 13.
2 ' Willis v. O'Connell, 231 Fed. 1004 (S. D. Ala., 1916).
2 District of Columbia v. Colts, supra n. 13.
21Callan v. Wilson, supra n. 13.
2 'Coates v. United States, 290 Fed. 134 (C. C. A. 4th, 1923).
'Low v. United States, supra n. 13.
' Danner v. State, 89 Md. 220, 42 At. 965 (1899).
21Supra n. 13.
20"It would be a narrow construction of the Constitution to hold that no
prosecution for a misdemeanor is a prosecution for a crime within the mean-
ing of the Third Article or a criminal prosecution within the meaning of the
Sixth Amendment." Callan v, Wilson, supra n. 13, at 127 U, S, 549,
08upra n. 13,
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well be classed as petty.' It has been held that if an offense be-
longs to the "classes of cases" which were triable by a jury at
the time of the adoption of the Constitution, they should now be
tried by a jury, and if an offense belongs to the "classes of cases"
which were triable summarily, then the constitutional guaranties
do not apply.'
Acts seem to have been dealt with summarily which did not
offend too deeply the moral sense of the community, and which
were not considered as offenses of grave character. A distinction
has been made between acts which are "malum prohibitum" and
those which are "malum in se. ' ' The question of moral delin-
quency and the punishment to be meted out have also been factors
in the classification of offenses. Social standards have changed
since the adoption of the Constitution and it is suggested that
present day rules of conduct, as well as the experiences of the
common law, may well be taken into consideration in determin-
ing the status of a particular act and its classification as either a
serious or a petty offense.
Trial by Jury in Federal District Courts
The fact that the Supreme Court of the United States has
held that there are some offenses called "petty offenses" which
according to the common law may be proceeded against summar-
ily in a "tribunal legally constituted for that purpose""B or "be-
fore a magistrate without a jury"' does not mean that there is
no right to a ju~y trial in a prosecution for a petty federal of-
fense. The federal district court has jurisdiction of all "crimes
and offenses" cognizable under the authority of the United
States, and the question to be answered is whether or not in a
prosecution for a petty offense, the accused has a right to a trial
by jury in the federal district court. The decisions of the Su-
preme Court have not gone this far. A review of the decisions
which have been rendered so far in the cases involving the con-
stitutional right to trial by jury in prosecutions for petty offenses
" The general rule stated is not to be narrowly construed, however, for
constitutional provisions may very properly be constructed as not limiting
the right strictly to those cases in which it had existed before the adoption
of the Constitution, but may further extend it to such new cases of like
nature as may afterwards arise. Colon v. Lish; 153 N. Y. 188, 47 N. E. 302,
60 A. S. . 609 (1897).
MeTnerney v. Denver, 17 Colo. 302, 29 Pac., 516 (1896).
"District of Columbia v. Colts, supra n. 13.
"Callan v. Wilson, supra n. 13.District of Columbia v. Colts, supra n. 13,
8
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will throw some light on the Court's attitude towards this mat-
ter and possibly furnish material on which to base a prediction
as to the Court's action were the question presented squarely
to it.
In Callan v. Wilson,' the accused was tried in the police
court of the District of Columbia for conspiracy. By statute,
the test as to whether the accused was entitled to a jury was his
right to a jury under the Constitution. The Court held that con-
spiracy was not a petty offense and the accused should have the
right to a jury trial:
"Except in that class or grade of offenses called petty
offenses which according to the common law, may be proceed-
ed against summarily in any tribunal legally constituted for
the purpose, the guarantee of an impartial jury to the accused
in a criminal prosecution conducted either in the name of or
by or under the authority of the United States, secures to
him the right to enjoy that mode of trial from the first mo-
ment and in whatever court he is put on trial for the offense
charged."
In his dissent in Schick v. United States," Mr. Justice Har-
lan points out that for the exception as to jury trial to apply,
the case must be tried "in a tribunal legally constituted for the
purpose." He contends that the offense must be a petty offense
and in order that it may be tried without a jury there must be
legislative authority to that effect.' He cites the Callan case as
authority.
In the Schick case,' which involved the trial of the defendant
in the federal district court for selling oleomargarine without a
stamp, the question arose as to whether the defendant could waive
his right to trial by jury. The Court decided that this was a
petty offense and that the right could be waived. The decision
seems to have been worked out by deciding that a petty offense
was not a crime under Article Three of the Constitution, there-
fore, the defendant had no right to a jury trial, and that since
the Sixth Amendment provided for trial by jury and also pro-
T Supra n. 13.
8 Supra n. 13.
3Justice Harlan-s holding was that no criminal offense or crime against
the United States can be tried except by jury, if the plea is not guilty, un-
less it be a petty offense or crime and unless the legislative department de-
clares that it may be so tried. He cites Blackstone to the effect that the
common law was a stranger to all summary proceedings and they were
authorized only by act of Parliament, See n. 11, supra,
'Supra n. 13.
9
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vided for confrontation of witnesses and the employment of
counsel, and the latter rights could be waived, then the right of
trial by jury could be waived.
"There is no act of Congress requiring that the trial
of all offenses shall be by jury, and a court is fully organized
and competent for the transaction of business without the
presence of a jury. There is no public policy which forbids
the waiver of a jury in the trial of petty offenses."
In Patton v. United States,' the Court held that the accused
may waive the right to trial by jury in a prosecution for a serious
offense. It was again decided that the constitutional right to a
jury trial is not jurisdictional but only a right given to the ac-
cused, which he may waive. It was pointed out that the first
ten Amendments and the original Constitution are to be con-
strued in pari mateyia. It might be argued that since the Schick
case decided that there was no right to a jury trial in a prosecu-
tion for a federal-petty offense under Article Three of the Con-
stitution and the Patton case decided that the SLxth Amendment
is to be coistrued in the same manner, there is no right to a trial
by a jury in the federal district court. It may be suggested,
however, that the decisions should not be taken to mean more
than they absolutely decide, namely, that the right to a jury trial
may be waived.
The Colts case arose in the police court of the District of
Columbia, where the defendant was fined for reckless driving. It
was decided that driving an automobile so as to endanger life and
property was a serious offense and the accused had a right to a
jury trial. The statements of the Court have a direct bearing on
our problem:
"Article 3 is to be interpreted in light of the common
law, according to which petty offenses might be proceeded
against summarily before a magistrate sitting without a jury.
"There are many offenses designated as petty offenses
which do not rise to the degree of crimes within the meaning
of Article 3, and in respect of which Congress may dispense
with a jury trial."
It is to be noted that the Callan case holds that a petty of-
fense may be proceeded against summarily "by a tribunal legal-
ly constituted for the purpose" and in the Colts case, it is said
0 Supra n. 13.
42 $upra n. 13.
10
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that it may be proceeded against summarily "before a magis-
trate sitting without a jury". It was never the intent of the
framers of the Judiciary Act' to make the federal court a sum-
mary tribunal or to treat the judge of the district court as a
magistrate for the trial of petty offenses,' and for this reason,
legislative enactment is deemed essential" in order that a jury
trial may be dispensed with in the federal district court, in case
it is demanded. Jury trials in the federal courts have been the
rule from time immemorial" and allowing a man to waive a right
which he has is quite different from taking from him that which
he has considered as a right since the foundation of the court.
The Colts case is authority for believing that Congress may
dispense with jury trials in prosecutions for petty offenses. It
would seem that legislation making the present district courts
legal tribunals for the summary trial of petty offenses, or legisla-
tion creating other tribunals with special summary powers, would
be declared constitutional."
When the federal district courts were first established in
1789,'" and for many years thereafter, there were but few crimes
triable in this court," and these were of a serious nature." With-
in the past few years, the number of crimes or offenses triable
-I Stat. 73 (1789).
'3Debates in Congress indicate that the district courts were to be com-
pared to the State courts and it was even provided that jurors in these courts
should have the same qualifications as those required for jurors in the high-
est state courts. One objection to the establishing of these courts was that
state courts were already organized and could take care of the business
which these courts were designed to handle. See 1 GALES & SEATON'S His-
TORY, supra n. 5 at.829 et. seq.
"The district courts having only such jurisdiction as is expressly authorized
by Congress under the Constitution, have no common law jurisdiction to try
and punish crimes. 9 HUGHES, FEDERAL PRACTICE (1931) 13.
"It was even thought, before the decisions in the Schick and Patton cases,
that jury trial could not be waived.
"The first plan suggested is not recommended and possibly its constitu-
tionality might be questioned. Such a plan would detract from the dignity
of the court and would not relieve the congestion now prevalent to any ex-
tent.
".Tuadiciariy Act, supra n. 42.
"The First Congress and the Second Congress passed no laws providing for
the trial of crimes in the district courts. The jurisdiction of the courts was
set forth in the original act but no crimes were created of which the dis-
trict court had jurisdiction.
"9 The jurisdiction of the district court was auite limited at the beginning;
the main reason for establishine the court seemed to be thnt some court was
necessary for ndmiraltv ,nd maritime cases. This iurisdiction was increased
and later the district courts were given jurisdiction of all crimes and
offenses.
11
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under federal laws has increased to an enormous extent. At
present, it might be said that much of the work of a criminal
nature done by the federal courts is such as is performed by
police courts and justices of the peace.'
It is not the purpose of this paper to discuss the recommenda-
tions which have been made for reducing the work of the federal
courts, and for providing especially for the trial of minor viola-
tions of the National Prohibition Act.' The problem of devising
some plan for relieving this congestion is now being studied both
by the National Commission on Law Observance and Enforce-
ment and federal officials. Should it be decided that the best
means of reducing the labor of the federal courts is to provide
federal police magistrates, it is submitted that the decisions pave
the way for the rendering of a decision in the future to the ef-
fect that there is no constitutional guaranty of a right to trial
by jury in prosecutions for petty federal offenses in the tribunals
thus established.
rO Lawyers everywhere deplore, as one of the most serious effects of prohi-
bition, the change in the general attitude toward the federal courts. Formerly
these tribunals were of exceptional dignity, and the efficiency and dispatch
of the criminal business commanded wholesome fear and respect. The pro-
fessional criminal, who sometimes had scanty respect for the state tribunals,
was careful so to conduct himself as not to come within the jurisdiction of
the federal courts. The effect of the large volume of liquor prosecutions,
which has come to these courts under prohibition, has injured their dignity,
impaired their efficiency, and endangered the wholesome respect for them
which once obtained. Instead of being impressive tribunals of superior
jurisdiction, they have had to do the work of police courts and that work
has been chiefly in the public eye. These deplorable conditions have been ag-
gravated by the constant presence in and about these courts of professional
criminal lawyers and bail-bond agents, whose unethical and mercenary prac-
tices have detracted from these valued institutions. Report on the Enforce-
ment of the Prohibition Laws of the United States, National Commission
on Law Observance and Enforcement, 71st Congress, 3d Session, H. R. Doe.
No. 722, p. 56 (1931).
In the year ending June 30, 1930, according to a memorandum supplied
by the Bureau of Prisons of the Department of Justice, 62 per cent of all
Federal prisoners received during the year were committed for sentences of
less than six months. The average sentence for all Federal prisoners re-
ceived during the year was 117 days or just under four months . . . . Thus
it is evident that petty prosecutions have at least come to bulk very large in
the work of the Federal courts. The Federal courts were not organized with
an eye to criminal business of this sort and have been conducted for over a
century with reference to a different type of causes. Report on Criminal
Procedure, National Commission on Law Observance and Enforcement, No. 8,
pp. 7, 8 (June 9, 1931).
5See Report of National Commission on Law Observance and Enforce-
ment, 71st Congress, 2d Session, H. R. Doc. No. 252, pp. 9 - 12, 17 - 25.
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